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Abstract 
Rather than increasing competition in the market and decreasing government spending, neoliberalism has 
driven states to compete by appealing to transnational corporations. Direct subsidization to attract 
investment has become one of the most egregious normalization of this process, and Hollywood and the 
film industry have become some of the most active participants to this system. Indeed to have a 
functioning film industry, government subsidies are essential, commonly paying out up to a third of the 
production costs. Per employee these are some of the highest subsidy rates of any industry, and with 
most of the world participating, they offer little long-term benefit to anyone besides the most global 
Hollywood studios. Rather, this creates greater dependency on the Major film studios by local 
government, workers, and small production companies to attract large production spending, but end up 
supporting an ever expanding system of subsidization. 
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  Today there is the normalization and expectation that film production 
undertaken by multinational media corporations based in Hollywood (and hereafter 
referred to as the Majors or Studios) will be subsidized by some level of 
government--local, national, or foreign. Subsidization of production costs--literally 
paying for a portion of the filming costs--is so pervasive today that most studios, 
and especially the multinational Majors that dominate the global industry, require 
it when choosing a location. Even the countries that have a history of film and 
cultural protectionism have adopted this strategy to attract Blockbuster productions 
for the sake of jobs and investment from the Majors. While this follows standard 
trends in market concentration in many industries, film production is especially 
notable due to its flexibility in production. That film productions are temporary, 
commonly shot on location, and consequently mobile, means production Studios 
do not need to permanently maintain crew, studios, and equipment in all locations 
they shoot. As a result, Studios have maximized their flexibility in shooting on 
varied and diverse locations, both within the U.S. and abroad. This results in 
Studios maximizing choices regarding where to shoot films. Thanks to this and 
their political, market, and financial power, the film industry has long established a 
pervasive and international system of countries competing for film investment 
through subsidies. I will refer to this as The International Subsidization System. 
 
Film subsidization has a long history, but since the 2000s this International 
Subsidization System reformed itself as a core component of Hollywood 
production. Under the common neoliberal defense to gain “jobs and 
competitiveness,” numerous provinces, states, and countries have joined in 
subsidizing film production in order to attract this very mobile industry. For film 
and other industries this has generated a “race to the bottom” where competition no 
longer exists simply on natural qualities (such as the most appropriate shooting 
location for film or studio infrastructure), or even regulation competition (such as 
wage and safety provisions), but has swung in favor of supply side factors so that 
the choice of production location is heavily determined by direct cash transfers 
provided to the requisite film or media corporation. Naturally this has resulted in 
an advanced form of race to the bottom, where, in combination with downward 
pressure for wages, unionization, and regulation, states are participating in 
financing production with no direct return on investment. The Majors claim that 
subsidization will bring employment, local production spending, and production 
infrastructure that is often advertised as contributing to a self-sustaining local 
industry. However, as will be seen, with the number of governments participating 
in film subsidization, the returns on government investment have mostly proved 
elusive. 
There has been much debate over the efficacy of corporate subsidization 
before the particularities of film subsidization are considered. Thom (2016, pp. 1) 
shows that “...some evaluations find positive (Wu, 2008; Zhang, 2015) or mixed 
effects (Langer, 2001; Wilder & Rubin, 1996), others provide no evidence of 
positive long-term impacts (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Prillaman & Meier, 2014; 
Taylor, 2012).” Others argue that subsidization has little effect on location choice 
for production (Lynch, 1996) and is thus simply paying for production that already 
exists. At best, positive outcomes from incentives and subsidies tend to be fleeting, 
either as the market catches up to the adjustment (Thom, 2016), or as competing 
programs crowd out initial gains of early adopters (Thom and An, 2017). The 
mobility and temporality of these projects, as well as the expanse of the 
subsidization scheme, means film subsidization should be one of the least useful 
industries to subsidize. Despite this, or perhaps because of this fact, the leading 
industry lobby, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), has actively 
supported the cultivation of this system due to the direct benefits such subsidization 
provides to their corporate members. As such, in 2011 film subsidies took up nearly 
2% of total subsidies within the US. While seemingly small, when compared to the 
largest subsidized industry of auto manufacturing at $5 billion, in 2012 the cost per 
employee was $12,465 for Film Production while “only” $6,745 for Auto 
Manufacturing.1 
 
 
Runaway production 
 
This direct subsidization of industries is uniquely high in film due to the 
mobility of production. While film production may conjure up images of artificial 
sets and warehouses, location shooting has long been central to the industry and 
was a major reason for choosing Hollywood as a primary location due to the varied 
ecology of California. Because the end product could easily be distributed across 
the country, there was little necessity to stay in New York, the original film capital. 
In fact, to be a film production company and distributor, ownership of a physical 
studio is not always necessary, such as United Artists, which was a production 
house “Studio” with no actual studio. Rather than directly own a studio backlot, the 
company would produce films and rent studios as needed. Without this overhead, 
producers are easily able to choose between locations and studios based on their 
needs. This particularly flexible and mobile aspect of film production led to its own 
industry term of “runaway production”. While good from a studio’s point of view, 
the derogatory nature of “runaway” was developed from the  perspective of critics 
who saw production, investment, and jobs unjustly leaving Los Angeles. More 
 
1 See Story, Fehr, and Watkins (2016) for subsidy amounts and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and U.S. Census Bureau (2015) for employment numbers.  
generally, this attests to the inherent flightiness of such temporary and mobile 
projects, which grew under neoliberal capitalism as flexible production became 
normalized. 
 
This project-based and temporary nature of film has a large impact on 
transforming run-away production into an industry wide norm (Thom and An, 
2017), but the nature of film production also plays a major role. Because of clear 
segmentation of production, one film can easily be done in multiple locations. This 
includes not only the actual filming, but also with pre- and post-production, which 
has even fewer locational requirements. With computer graphics and the use of 
green screens, many of the artists and film workers do not even need to be in the 
same location. This manner of production has itself helped solidify the labor 
delineation with the film industry, between “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” 
labor. The former includes the higher paid jobs, such as producer, writer, director 
and actors, while the latter refers to more physical jobs such as technicians, grips, 
set artists, and stagehands.  
 
In relation to the supply chain hierarchy, these labor categories can be 
considered “higher value-added” and “lower value-added,” but also relates the 
mobility of production. Much of the creative, above-the-line work can be done 
anywhere, and the few who need to be on location, such as directors or leading 
actors, can be flown in to location. Below-the-line labor is more replaceable and 
not transported with production.  As a result, runaway production tends to benefit 
above-the-line who travel with production, while below-the-line become more 
dependent on the mobile production attraction. In the end, this has helped solidify 
labor groups, including unions, in working with the MPAA and other associations 
to expand film subsidies, usually for their short-term benefits, but ultimately for the 
longer term and larger benefit to non-replaceable talent--such as famous actors and 
names used for advertisement--but especially for the leading Major Studios.   
 
Runaway productions greatly helped the Major Studios combat costs and 
labor power concentrating in Hollywood. Even during the peak of the Studio Era, 
where film and theater concentration was at its highest, there were infamous clashes 
with unions representing numerous sectors of Hollywood production. The focal 
point of these Union-Studio battles in the 1940s (Spaner, 2012). Most notably was 
the Black Friday battle, which started with picket lines led by the Conference of 
Studio Unions, which shut down productions at Major Studios, such as Warner 
Bros. While many were injured in the fight, many more were arrested and fired. 
Despite initial concessions on wages, the Major Studios still retained much 
concentrated power and state support; ultimately the Conference of Studio Unions 
was disbanded and incorporated into the much more malleable International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. While the Majors retained their 
monopolistic hold on all sectors of film distribution, production, and exhibition 
they had more ability to placate or end any strong unions. However, as that power 
faded in the decades following the Paramount Decree, the 1948 antitrust suit that 
ended film studios from owning and monopolizing theaters, the Majors 
increasingly focused on international markets. This was done both to recoup their 
revenue beyond the growing competition of indie studios, but also to lower 
production costs and their dependence on Hollywood labor.  
 
It is thus with the Paramount Decree that Runaway production became an 
institution for the Majors, as well as a tool for retaining control after losing theater 
investments (Scott, 2002; Christopherson and Storper, 1986). With the loss of 
assured exhibition for all films, the so-called “Fordist” production of the Studio era 
necessarily ended. No longer would production be churned out like a factory, with 
overlapping sets, actors, and plots. Without control over exhibition, the large, 
integrated, factory-like studios became a larger liability for the Majors. The Decree, 
as a result, helped bring about what Christopherson and Storper (1986) calls 
Flexible Specialization. This term refers to the creation of a specific and particular 
product, as opposed to mass production of general products, with the means to 
quickly change or refocus effort and equipment, usually done through a network of 
smaller producers. Film was especially conducive to this manner of production, 
especially as the Mass production of the Studio Era gave way to an increasing 
reliance on mobile production.2 Much like other transnationalized industries, the 
Majors could use studios, labor, and locations around the world in a replaceable 
fashion, thus developing the network of smaller producers needed for Flexible 
Specialization. Not owning studios or permanent employees in these varied 
locations allows the Majors to quickly shift location and change productions, while 
the ownership of Intellectual Property and ability to finance Blockbusters allows 
the generation of specific and unique products. It was then up to the disposable 
locations to attract these productions through skills, infrastructure, and 
subsidization. The start of this Subsidization System had its strongest expression in 
 
2 It was likely that the monopolized production and exhibition of the Studio Era itself was 
resulting in the particular style of product and consumption. However, as broadcast television was 
increasingly competing with theaters the days of mass production for film were likely already 
numbered. The Spectacle of the big screen, along with selling points such as “cinerama”, 
“cinemascope”, and early on the use of sound, would no longer be enough to get customers out of 
the house once they had a television. As a result, specialization of film itself was increasingly 
necessary to draw a crowd that was becoming content with cheaper television production, 
resulting in increased budgets and greater need to reduce costs. See Crafton (1999) for a history of 
the early role of technical innovation in film and Seabury (1926) for a history of Major Studio 
control prior to runaway production. 
runaway production leaving Hollywood for the Canadian West Coast, still 
relatively nearby.    
 
 
International Subsidies: Canada and Europe 
 
As Davis and Kaye (2002) reveal, Canadian theaters have always been 
dominated by the larger market to the South, to a degree that the Canadian market 
has been integrated enough to be considered as part of the “domestic market” by 
the MPAA. Canadian films generally makes up 5-10% of the “Domestic” revenue 
box office, of which Hollywood films “account for approximately 90 percent.” 
(Davis and Kaye, 2002). By the 21st century, Foreign (American) productions in 
Canada even made up 85% of Canadian film exports (Davis and Kaye, 2002; 
CFTPA 2008). While Montreal and Toronto hold their own in film production, both 
in foreign and domestic productions, it is Vancouver on the less populated West 
Coast that receives half of production spending (Davis and Kaye, 2002). While this 
is part due to geography and proximity to Hollywood, the politics of International 
Runaway Production along with the subsequent Subsidization System, is the largest 
factor. 
 
Prior to the 1990s, Canada, much like other states, was weary of Hollywood 
and thus focused their film subsidization schemes on protecting culture and 
promoting domestic art. In the 1960s much of Canadian film production came from 
the more populated East Coast, resulting in British Columbia on the West lagging 
behind both in media consumption and production, resulting in an underdeveloped 
cultural industry. As such, as Hollywood increasingly looked toward foreign 
productions as a means to lower budget cost and circumvent local unions, British 
Columbia saw the opportunity largely in terms of “regional industrial development” 
and a means to “a way to attract immigrants, capital investment, and tourists” 
(Gasher, 2002). As such, unlike other programs that were at least initially directed 
toward domestic production and culture, the British Columbia subsidy scheme was 
specifically designed to target mobile Hollywood productions and develop a local 
industry out of that relationship (Gasher, 2002). As much of the Canadian media 
consumption in British Columbia came from the East Coast the likelihood of 
developing a fully independent local industry was already low and thus the larger 
and closer Studios of Hollywood had more to offer. 
 
Initially as Vancouver began to take larger shares of film production in 
Canada, national subsidies continued to focus on developing and protecting cultural 
industries, with much of these funds going to the more developed media industry 
on the East Coast. These cultural protections continued into the 1990s, including 
cultural exceptions being a large part of Canadian goals during NAFTA 
negotiations. Much of Europe was facing similar conflicts with Hollywood, both 
over cultural concerns as well as keeping subsidies to domestic studios rather than 
Hollywood. However, it was the active and direct solicitation of Hollywood Majors 
by British Columbia's subsidization scheme that shaped how governments would 
attract Runaway Production in the future. By the late 1990s state-to-state 
competition for Hollywood productions began to take shape. This is concurrent 
with Canadian national film subsidies shifting from focusing on cultural to 
economic indicators, tacitly opening up these funds to foreign productions. EU film 
subsidies also began to downplay cultural concerns to the advancement of 
immediate and short-term concerns, as did individual US states who began to rely 
on subsidization to compete for jobs and growth in their local industries. By the 
21st century, an entrenched International Subsidization Scheme had been 
developed, based entirely on neoliberal logic of open markets, transnational 
production, and supply-side support, to the disproportionate benefit of the 
Multinationals of the MPAA. 
 
Europe 
 
The European film industries followed a fairly similar experience to 
Canada. Though not included in the “Domestic Market” as Canada is, Western 
Europe saw early dominance from Hollywood. However, while European subsidies 
would sometimes reach Hollywood productions, the goal in attraction of Runaway 
Production, as pioneered by British Colombia, only reached Europe once the 
International Subsidy system was already in full swing. Many Western European 
states initially had a more robust domestic film industry to protect, with more 
independence compared to Canada. As a result there had consistently been stronger 
political support to attempt to rebuild a competitive industry. This was especially 
true following WWII, when Hollywood was very much dominant across the 
Atlantic. In perhaps an early demonstration of the transnationalism that 
neoliberalism would soon bring, the mixture of protectionism, subsidies of 
European industries, and reliance and dependence on American products and firms, 
actually helped lead to Europe eventually joining the Subsidy System. 
 
The fragility of the economies in Europe following the war left many 
industries with the precarious situation of needing immediate goods while also 
needing to rebuild competitive industries. For film, even for countries like France 
as an inventor of the medium and especially concerned with culture and language, 
this meant a relatively wide opening for American films for European consumers, 
whose demand could not yet be met domestically. With this vulnerability and 
dependence, there were few ways for these states to combat the power of 
Hollywood. These included direct protection of domestic film production that 
conflicted with the post-war trade system; subsidization of domestic film, initially 
around cultural products; limitations on the repatriation of profits by foreign 
producers, to force local investment in production; and integration of local 
production into the Hollywood system, to attempt to move up the hierarchy rather 
than exit it. 
 
This interaction of means of production, which ended up feeding the 
industry hierarchy rather than opposing it, can best be seen in the operations of the 
British film industry and development, which has always been more closely 
integrated with the American industry. While London participated in similar means 
to revamp their film industry following the war, they also were more accepting of 
integrating their industry into the larger and more global American multinationals. 
As early as the 1950s, Britain set up a subsidy scheme known as “Eady Pool of 
Funds”. This was a tax on movies, which would then be given as a rebate to film 
productions that were considered “British” (Lev, 2003. p. 153). However, due to 
American financing and runaway production many of the subsidies went to 
American productions or co-productions with American financing (the latter has 
become an increasingly important and growing trend in today’s system). The “Eady 
Pool "was of decisive importance in persuading U.S. producers to shift operations 
from Hollywood to London" (Bernstein, 1960, Quoted in Lev, 2003, pp. 153). Even 
the measures stopping Hollywood from repatriating profits back to America ended 
up supporting transnational productions, as the capital stuck in European countries 
were used to fund productions there, helping to blur their nationality and thus their 
access to these early subsidies.  
 
As Britain saw economic success with its willingness to integrate into 
Hollywood’s international system, as well as supporting the Hollywood system 
politically and economically, other states began to open up to such competition as 
well. “France and Italy had similar, but less generous, subsidy programs. Though 
the original intent had been to support national film producers, Great Britain, Italy, 
and France were willing to subsidize Hollywood film companies as well in order to 
stimulate film industry investment and employment” (Lev, 2003, pp. 153). As these 
production markets increasingly become infiltrated by Hollywood, by 1960 40% of 
“...movies financed by Hollywood majors were shot overseas.” (Monaco, 2003, pp. 
14). Most of this was in the UK with two-thirds of their films having Hollywood 
financing. However, Italy and France, known for strong cultural protectionism, 
were integrated into the production as well, with 3 out of every 10 French 
productions having Hollywood financing (Monaco, 2003). In 1962, Hollywood got 
$5 million in subsidies from Britain, Italy, and France alone (Monaco, 2003, pp. 
12). 
 Expansion of Subsidies: American States 
 
Despite Europe inadvertently subsidizing some Hollywood productions, the 
early adopters of the model to attract runaway productions were still British 
Columbia, with American states following soon after--a process which helped to 
further consolidate the International Subsidization System. This exponential 
expansion can be seen in the chart below. This immediate adoption of subsidies by 
other states was likely a result of relative success in attracting Major productions 
for the early subsidizers, such as British Colombia. However, the early successes 
were heavily due to the lack of competition from other locations. As other 
governments developed their own subsidies to attract production, these benefits 
eroded while the expectation to fund production continued. Even existing film 
centers, such as California and New York, adopted subsidizing local productions, 
and themselves have allocated some of the largest funds to stop production from 
leaving. Others, such as Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, like many of the newer 
countries to the International Subsidy System, were attempting to create a new local 
film industry, ostensibly one that would eventually be self-sustaining, presumably 
on the assumption that their own subsidies would be able to sustain localized 
benefits despite rising competition. 
 
Number of Incentive Programs and Funds3  
Year Number of U.S. States with Film Incentive 
Programs 
Incentive Amounts Offered 
1999 & earlier 4 $2 million 
2000 4 $3 million 
2001 4 $1 million 
2002 5 $1 million 
2003 5 $2 million 
 
3 See McDonald (2011) for 1999- 2011 figures and Bishop-Henchman (2016) for the 2012 figure. 
2004 9 $68 million 
2005 15 $129 million 
2006 24 $369 million 
2007 33 $489 million 
2008 35 $807 million 
2009 40 $1.247 billion 
2010 40 $1.396 billion 
2011 37 $1.299 billion 
2012 40 $1.4 billion 
 
Louisiana was one of the first states to adopt film subsidies to develop a 
local production industry. Having an already established a cultural and tourism 
industry, as well as a temperate climate to allow shooting year-round, Louisiana 
became a sensible choice for film production. But their entry into subsidy 
competition was as much about attempting to attract existing production away from 
other locations, as it was of creating new production. This was followed by a New 
Mexico scheme, which became part of the first wave of developing a competitive 
subsidization among US states (Thom, 2016). Although these schemes had the 
intent, much as the British Columbia scheme pioneered, to focus on economic 
benefits opposed to the classic subsidies for culture, they had not reached the 
financial extent and broad-participation that made up a fully competitive system 
until the 2000s (See amount offered between 2003 and 2004). As Tannenwald 
(2010, pp. 3) reveals: 
 
Until 2002 state film subsidies were limited in scope. A few states offered 
film producers small credits against income taxes, deductions from taxable 
income for losses incurred in production, or loan guarantees. Other 
subsidies were confined to the provision of public services at no cost (for 
example, police details, ready access to public lands, assistance in 
identifying locations, and expedited permitting), or exemption from sales 
tax on purchases of goods from local vendors and from hotel and lodging 
taxes for employees working on an in-state movie shoot. These subsidies 
may or may not have been the best possible use of funds, but they were low-
cost and therefore relatively harmless.  
 
Preston, in elaborating further on this first, more limited phase of 
subsidization during the 1990s and early 2000s and specifically using Louisiana as 
a case study, wrote that “For the first ten years of its existence [started in 1992], 
Louisiana’s program underperformed (Grand 2006, 792-793), and any film 
production that had been lured away from Los Angeles or New York typically went 
to Vancouver, British Columbia.“ (Preston, 2013). By the late 1990s competitive 
subsidization began to be seen as essential for maintaining a decent film industry, 
driving many other states to compete with their own subsidies. By 1997, the 
Canadian government began remodeling their national film subsidies around their 
perceived economic interest, taking their cues from the early success of British 
Columbia and Vancouver. Likewise, Hawaii (in 1997), Missouri (in 1999) and 
Oklahoma (in 2001) developed their own systems, and Louisiana and New Mexico 
once again followed the Canadian model and substantially expanded their subsidies 
in 2002 (Thom and An, 2017). 
 
While the number of competing subsidies expanded across North America, 
and later internationally, the subsidies expanded also in amount of funds and in how 
they were offered. Away from the indirect subsidies described by Tannenwald for 
early schemes, subsidies have since developed into direct cash transfers. The varied 
and indirect subsidies include those for housing, finding skilled workers, or even 
location scouting, but the more sought-after and costly subsidies have been tax 
credits. These subsidies can be divided between transferable tax credits and 
refundable tax credits (Thom, 2016). Transferable tax credits are tax waivers 
offered to a production company for a set amount, usually a percentage of 
production costs, which can then be sold to another party for a discount on the 
waiver amount. Thus, the purchaser receives a discount on their potential tax 
payment, while the producers receive immediate cash to offset production costs. 
While transferable credits offered immediate cash, refundable credits offer a direct 
transfer of cash to the producer for the full amount of the credit (McDonald, 2011). 
These aggressive and large subsidies have, according to Thom, had modest impacts. 
Employment was most affected by transferable credits, while wages were most 
affected by refundable credits, but for both affects the benefits were short-term. To 
view the extent of the long-term problems, dependence, and entrenchment of the 
corporate oligopoly it will help to examine some case studies of US states, followed 
by an analysis of the global subsidy system. Here I will examine three of the larger 
domestic subsidy schemes--one to retain and recoup production (California), one 
that failed and ended (Florida), and one with strong and continuous expansion 
(Georgia). 
 
Florida 
 
 Florida is an interesting case in examining its subsidy program due to the 
extent, length, and relative large-scale size of their program, which was later 
discontinued. Florida was one of the possible locations for the first movie moguls, 
as Jacksonville was scouted along with Hollywood due to its climate. Florida also 
possesses relatively strong production in Orlando and Miami, both as an on-site 
location for production as well as a location for Spanish-language television. As a 
Southern and “right to work” state, Florida also holds weak unions, which 
according to neoliberal proponents (including the MPAA itself) should make it a 
front runner for a successful development of film infrastructure. As such, compared 
to many of the other participants in production attraction and subsidization, Florida 
should have been one of the stronger candidates for successful development of a 
strong local film industry. The fact it did not have success will help illustrate both 
the inherent problems and limitations of subsidies, as well as the contradictions in 
a competitive subsidy system, whereby permanent subsidies become necessary. 
 
 Florida started its initial film incentive program in 1993, following soon 
after the Louisiana program. And, much like Louisiana, this early Florida program 
was missing the direct cash transfers described above, only offering the smaller 
incentives that were common at the time. This still had the goal of attracting mobile 
film production, but had a much smaller impact, both in budget and effect. Initially 
this incentive program was developed under the Florida Entertainment 
Commission, but it was reshaped into a specific office, The Office of Film and 
Entertainment (OFE) in 1999, within The Department of Economic Opportunity 
(Wilcox and Krassner, 2014). The transition into the OFE occurred with the general 
normalization of expanding subsidies, along with the inclusion of direct cash 
subsidies, again following along other expanding models in North America. 
Despite Florida still getting a relatively early start, already at its founding in 1999, 
the OFE had received a budget expected to grow year upon year, which would be 
necessary to compete with a sizable number of subsidy programs. 
 
As with other subsidy schemes, to legitimize the program as not simply 
corporate welfare but as jumpstarting local industry, the original legislation 
authorizing the program had a mix of language emphasizing the creation of 
production infrastructure and attracting production from other regions. It is 
interesting to note that the OFE website today has a much stronger emphasis in 
attracting production from other regions, rather than generating new production in 
Florida. Like other schemes, the proponents of this excessive spending also 
emphasize the indirect multiplier of film tourism, an easy target for the economy of 
Florida. Once again the influence of the Major studios and the MPAA are evident 
in the drafting and implementation of the film subsidization programs. The MPAA 
is a member of local film associations, in particular Film Florida, which, like 
lobbying projects in other states, publishes the purported economic benefits of 
subsidies, with a special emphasis on tourism, due to the indirect and thus 
unfalsifiable connection--more tourism becomes an anticipated outgrowth of 
locating film production in the host state. News organizations and lobbying groups 
reference these MPAA reports when providing data pertaining to the efficacy of 
subsidies. 
 
As the budgets for competitive subsidies ballooned in the first decade of the 
2000s, by 2010 the Florida Legislature passed The Entertainment Industry 
Economic Development Act, which allocated $242 Million to the OFE to 
incentivize and attract film production to Florida. This budget was designed to 
cover a five-year period, after which it could be supplemented with more 
subsidization. This, however, led to failure and the eventual dissolution of the 
subsidy budget for two reasons. One, although high in total, spread over 5 years, 
this would have been relatively small compared to the leading subsidizing states, 
such as Georgia and California. As such, Florida was likely hedging its location 
and natural attraction, but having a smaller than average budget within a race to the 
bottom would likely have been unsuccessful, given the pattern of other half-
supported programs in South Dakota and Indiana, which did little in the way of 
generating an independently sustainable local industry (Thom, 2016). 
 
However, the program in Florida was not terminated due to tepid responses 
to a smaller than average budget, or after the number of programs diluted the 
success of early adopters. Rather the end to the program came relatively quickly as 
the money dried up due to the lack of a spending cap per project--an outcome which 
reveals the propensity toward corruption and lack of accountability inherent to such 
programs (Thom and An, 2017). Without a cap, the cash ran out “nearly 
immediately” due to the money being made available on a first-come-first-serve 
basis (Walser, 2016). Cash was given out to any production that qualified, rather 
than based on an analysis of cost and benefits to measure whether or not such 
spending produced lasting infrastructure or recurring production. In subsequent 
years supplemental additions were given to the budget, but without a fundamental 
change these too were quickly depleted in the same manner. By 2013 no 
supplements were added, and the Florida subsidy system was out of funds. 
 
The limited effects and quick depletion of film subsidy programs in Florida 
have been criticized for a loss of jobs and production in the state. Interest groups, 
including “Enterprise Florida,” the state’s economic development arm that 
incentivizes companies, and “Visit Florida,” the state’s tourism marketing arm, had 
advocated recreating a subsidy system to retain possible production, utilizing the 
rhetoric of defending Florida jobs (Irwin, Oct 20, 2017). Two leading groups in this 
effort are Film Florida and COMPASS Florida. Film Florida is a lobbying group, 
representing numerous groups including film schools, local producers or 
associations, and even Universal Studios. Film Florida is very much the local 
component to the MPAA, and acts to promote local legitimacy for the maintenance 
and expansion of a film subsidy system in the state. Like in other states, Film 
Florida has been a participant in commissioning favorable reports with which to 
lobby politicians and provide the public with positive figures pertaining to the film 
subsidy program. Film Florida also works in partnership with the OFE, but has also 
pushed for taking over the subsidy fund as a public-private partnership, citing lack 
of marketing skills by state agencies (Film Florida, 2013). COMPASS Florida is 
likewise representative of related film unions as well as small businesses. 
 
To keep up with the ever-increasing subsidies among competing states 
(especially neighboring Georgia), the suggestion was for $1 Billion in subsidies 
(Hanks, January 29, 2014). As of now, the trade and labor organizations have put 
forward a more modest proposal for a “Florida Motion Picture Capital 
Corporation.” Rather than offer subsidies through cash transfers, the “Capital 
Corporation” would operate as a “more traditional investment mode” and 
theoretically make money, though where initial funds would come from are unclear 
(Irwin, October 20, 2017). However, in step with criticisms of corporate welfare, 
greater emphasis is placed on allocating resources based on “...which projects 
create the greatest number of high-wage jobs…” (Taddeo, 2018). In the meantime, 
local municipalities have started to get in on subsidies with Miami-Dade creating a 
$100,000 local subsidy program (Hanks, July 19, 2017). Miami has emerged as a 
focal point for the Florida film subsidy system, as South Florida had received 78% 
of program funds by 2013 (Hanks, January 29, 2014). 
 
Georgia 
 
As some states see little hope in competing with innumerable locations and 
massive subsidies (North Dakota) or have otherwise ended their subsidy system 
with failure (Florida), Georgia is commonly held up by proponents of the system 
as an example of success, with a relatively strong production industry in an unlikely 
state, concentrated around the capital of Atlanta. In recent years Georgia has found 
itself in competition for the leading destination of production for the highest 
grossing films, along with California, New York, and international (and strongly 
subsidized) locations of Canada and the UK. However, unsurprisingly, it finds itself 
with one of the highest budgets for its subsidy program, trailing only New York. 
Having spent multiple billions over the life of its program, Georgia can attribute its 
“success” to entering this inevitable “next tier” of cash transfers. Thus, while 
Georgia may compete with residual strength (but still large subsidies) of California, 
and the giant subsidies of New York, it does so without caps to spending, without 
emphasis on independent productions and new projects that California emphasizes, 
and without a focus on local labor. 
 
With loose requirements from producers and some of the highest and most 
friendly incentives, Georgia is able to match the leading domestic locations of 
California and New York, and then surpass them through cheaper labor and 
locations (especially compared to New York which can partially explain their high 
budget). Georgia is also commonly seen as being the leading competitor for 
“southern” locations, beating out Louisiana, and likely one of the reasons for 
Florida to drop out of the subsidy race. The movie Live By Night is a great example, 
being set in Ybor City, Florida, yet being shot in Brunswick, Georgia thanks for the 
30% tax credit offered (Irwin, October 20, 2017). Other Florida-based directors has 
discussed moving future productions to neighboring states such as Georgia and 
Alabama, either from a necessity to compete in a low production cost environment 
or to also generate further pressure toward an expanded incentive program 
(Boedeker, November 30, 2014). 
 
While the success of Georgia is heavily a result of attracting existing 
production, it also reveals other problems with such schemes. Georgia has faced a 
shortage of film crews (McWhirter and Schwartzel, 2015). Despite offering no 
subsidy cap on salary, as well as offering incentives to non-resident workers, 
specifically to attract production as opposed to generating it, the state has found it 
difficult to retain such mobile labor and investments. Due to these limitations, the 
large Georgia program has been in the crosshairs of the same organizations that 
helped end the Florida program, including libertarian Koch groups. Georgia has, 
instead, doubled-down, increasing their budget, thanks to overstated claims of 
economic benefits from the program, usually from reports again commissioned by 
MPAA and local partners. These reports have been utilized to prolong and expand 
such programs by greatly overstating their benefits for the state using an outdated 
and fairly arbitrary multiplier to calculate program impacts. The multiplier effect 
(the compounding effect of incentive money being put into the local economy) 
itself becomes overstated by using a very optimistic assumption of how much 
money from film production stays in Georgia. In fact, much of the subsidized costs 
are not permanent nor are they limited to local labor. “Georgia’s 30% credit is not 
only more generous than that of most states, including California’s; it also allows 
producers to count salaries of directors and actors in addition to below-the-line crew 
as part of their qualified expenses, as long as the payment is for work performed 
within the state.” (Johnson, 2015) 
 
Studio Advertising in Georgia: 
 
 
Georgia conditions: Georgia advertisement of benefits: 
 
● 20 percent base transferable tax credit 
● 10 percent Georgia Entertainment Promotion (GEP) uplift can be earned by 
including an embedded Georgia logo on approved projects and a link to 
ExploreGeorgia.org/Film on the promotional website 
● $500,000 minimum spend to qualify 
● No limits or caps on Georgia spend, no sunset clause 
● Both resident and non-resident workers’ payrolls and FICA, SUI, FUI 
qualify 
● No salary cap on individuals paid by 1099, personal service contract or loan 
out. Payments made to a loan out company will require six percent Georgia 
income tax withheld 
● Production expenditures must be made in Georgia to qualify from a Georgia 
vendor 
● Travel and insurance qualify if purchased through a Georgia agency or 
company 
● Original music scoring eligible for projects produced in Georgia qualify 
● Post-production of Georgia filmed movies and television projects qualify if 
post done in Georgia 
● Development costs, promotion, marketing, license fees and story right fees 
do not qualify 
California 
 
Unlike Florida and Georgia, California has been much more reactionary in 
response to the subsidy system. For much longer local producers and unions have 
been complaining of investment flight and the loss of jobs and wages. The earlier 
experience for Californian film workers, along with L.A. being the “home” location 
of the Majors, makes it an especially important case study. California may have not 
been the originator of the subsidy system (Canada and Louisiana) but it was an 
early exercise for the MPAA to learn how to increase dependency within the 
industry, generate industry control on the supply-side as well as through labor 
flexibility, and to use the Hollywood location to reinforce the Majors’ position in 
the industry hierarchy. “The industry trade group quarterbacked the campaign to 
stop "runaway production." The MPAA rounded up a broad coalition, including 
chambers of commerce, labor groups, and cities up and down the state. Offering a 
bonus for productions outside Los Angeles helped win over Northern California 
lawmakers, who have traditionally opposed tax giveaways to a Southern California 
industry” (Maddaus, 2014). 
 
Employment by state:4
 
 
 
4 Weatherford (2016) 
The Majors are not only the major utilizers of mobile productions and 
subsidies, but also a leading voice in expanding those subsidies. Rather than 
assisting in the development and expansion of local film production industries in 
California, the systemic nature of subsidies, all supported by the MPAA, end up 
canceling each other out and largely operates to further the transnationalization 
objectives of the Major Studios. As seen in the previous figure, labeled 
“Employment by State,” California, and in particular L.A., continues to be the 
largest production center for film. As with all subsidy schemes, it has been 
suggested that one-third of the subsidized productions would have remained in 
California anyway, weakening the case for subsidization as a necessary 
contribution for retaining film industry investment and jobs in the state (Bishop-
Henchman, 2016). 
 
Although California has long been experiencing the process of “runaway” 
film production, the state had been relatively slow in participating in the subsidy 
system. This was likely due to the already existing local infrastructure and supply 
networks for the industry. Because of the obvious narrow benefits of such types of 
subsidies, the need to legitimize both infrastructure and temporariness seen in other 
states did not quite work in California. It is only with the entrenchment of the 
subsidy system in other states, did California come late in 2009 toward a more full-
blown participant in the International Subsidization system, which has expanded in 
recent years as California has become one of the leading domestic state subsidizers.   
 
It was in 2009 that the political and economic power of the Majors in 
California bore institutional fruit, with the creation of a $100 million “Tax Credit 
Program 1.0” under the California Film Commision. This budget cap was expanded 
in 2015 to $330 million (with program 2.0), making California one of the leading 
participants in competitive subsidies. Like the suggested “Film Corporation” in 
Florida, Program 2.0 has a large focus on project selection based on jobs, and with 
a more diverse project allocation, with 40% devoted to TV Series, Pilots, and 
Television Movies; 35% to Non-independent Films (read: Majors); 20% to 
Relocating TV Series; and 5% to Independent Films. The strong emphasis on TV 
series (60%) means production that provides more stable and permanent jobs, but 
also is connected to the majors and owners of the distribution-channels for such 
production (Maddaus, 2014). The fact that 20% of funds are specifically allocated 
to relocation of TV series also reveals the growing focus on relocation for such 
programs, rather than the creation of production that would not otherwise have 
existed. 
 
McDonald (2011) argues for a national subsidy system, as the state subsidy 
system, which again are some of the leading subsidizers in the world, does not 
create new production, and rather results in a race-to-the-bottom subsidization of 
existing production. While this would help reduce the race to the bottom 
domestically, the Majors would still have options to exploit the international 
system, and location choice would continue to operate on merit second and cash 
transfers first. The largest to lose out would be local indie producers and labor, 
unless they themselves are mobile. Such a national system would benefit 
Hollywood and California, and disrupt existing dispersed production infrastructure, 
such as from Georgia, while the Majors would continue to benefit as the 
international subsidy competition would continue. 
 
Largest Box Office Revenue Film Production locations5 
 
 
5 (McDonald, 2016) 
International  
 
Some countries such as France, whether due to cultural protectionism or 
relative size of the market, had been able to build domestic industries semi-
independent of the Majors, even if they do participate in subsidies. Germany, 
however, is an especially interesting case, as it has a relatively strong industry, 
decent international reach from its movies, and a history of film and cultural 
protection comparable to France, if not quite as strong. Despite this, Germany 
developed a reputation of having its subsidy system, which had initially been 
developed to strengthen the domestic industry, exploited, especially by the Majors 
of Hollywood. With subsidies as high as 55% from federal and state (Länder) 
sources (Jansen, 2005) foreign producers accessed these “domestic” subsidies 
through co-production deals with domestic entities, much as was done earlier in 
Britain. While Germany has since cracked down on these “in name only” co-
productions, the financing deals that helped the majors integrate and penetrate the 
European production markets, have become increasingly commonplace and 
continue to be a key component of the International Subsidy System. 
 
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider provides an excellent example of utilizing 
multiple locations, pre-sales, subsidies, and partners to reduce risk on a strong 
budget. With a budget of $94 million, according to Epstein (2005) the main 
production company, Paramount (Viacom), only paid in $7 million, leaving $84 
million from other contributors, including state subsidies. Germany is a prime 
example of subsidy abuse by transnational corporations, as the conditions in its 
Film Funds did not reflect the social utility of either jobs for locals, protecting local 
culture, or developing a domestic film industry. Germany also had some of the 
largest subsidies: 250 Million Euros in 2005. Instead “German law simply requires 
that the film be produced by a German company that owns its copyright and shares 
in its future profits.” (Epstein, 2005). Paramount’s German partners were KFP 
Produktions GmbH & Co. KG, whose only credits on IMDB are Tomb Raider and 
licensing of Tomb Raider footage, and Tele München Fernseh 
Produktionsgesellschaft (TMG), which moved into domestic TV production after 
these film subsidy loopholes were cut. 
 
The notoriety and ability for abuse of German subsidies were quickly 
integrated into the general operations of Hollywood. As Lindsey (2006) notes, “No 
wonder then that this source of funding was commonly referred to in the 
boardrooms of LA as ‘stupid German money” (quoted in Cooke, 2007). As the 
Subsidy System was still developing in the early 2000s, the German exploitation 
was especially notable. This brought the German Chancellor's Grand Coalition to 
make “pulling the plug” on these funds one of their first actions in November 2005. 
While some funds were cut with an ostensible goal toward “New German Cinema” 
rather than Hollywood productions through German entities, this process coincided 
with the entrenchment of commercially driven market subsidies. As such, while 
ostensibly new subsidy programs would focus on arthouse films and around 
director visions, they were designed for German and European films to compete 
commercially on an international scale (Cooke, 2007). With the EU being a driver 
toward commercial subsidization, and Germany retaining both national and state 
subsidy programs, this reliance on market-driven subsidies (as opposed to a cultural 
and art criteria) leads to a contradiction that does little to halt the race-to-the-bottom 
effect of subsidies. As Europe focuses on local commercial films they can still 
partner with the larger productions from Hollywood as the Majors focus more on 
globally targeted blockbusters. 
 
As a result of Germany’s unique position relative to its smaller neighbors 
Germany has plans to expand its already large and numerous subsidy programs 
(Deutsche Welle, 2017). However, with the clear strength of Hollywood Majors 
and the international entrenchment of subsidy systems, this increase of subsidies is 
without the traditional focus of cultural concerns. As such, the results have been to 
entrench the oligopolistic position of the Majors by contributing to a two-tiered 
system with two characteristics: 1) European filmmakers are subsidized to compete 
on the “medium” level film market, as Hollywood increasingly focuses on the 
global blockbusters. This allows leading European producers to break through the 
idiosyncratic local market and increasingly compete internationally, essentially 
creating a second-tier mini-major status. 2) Continue to participate in attracting 
large investments from Hollywood blockbusters, thus sustaining the system and 
accepting a 2nd tier position in the oligopolistic hierarchy.   
 
 
Efficacy and generation of the System Globally 
 
 As states began to openly compete for what was a finite amount of 
production spending and mobile projects, the efficacy and utilization of such 
schemes began to become questioned. While the debate is largely dispersed 
between cost of subsidies on the one hand and short-term versus long-term gains 
on the other, what is clear is that the Subsidization normalization during this period 
coalesced with the reconsolidation of the Film Industry into Mass Media 
Conglomerates and, as a result, a dramatic increase in both political and economic 
power of the MPAA cartel, which had a strong role in developing this system. Even 
within general neoliberal pressures to increase competitiveness and open markets, 
the dependency generated by the Majors and the MPAA put film in a unique 
position. As such, of the total $80 billion of direct subsidizations to corporations 
from Washington and US states in 2011, $1.455 billion was for the film industry, 
making it one of the most subsidized industries. As mentioned, per job/employee 
film subsidization has been about 50% higher than the better known and heavily 
subsidized auto industry. 
 
Looking at U.S. state subsidies Thom and An (2017) argue that the strongest 
reason for starting a subsidization program revolves around poor economic 
conditions as well as high unemployment. This is based around the intention to 
provide employment relief, even if the jobs are temporary, as well as help diversify 
the economy. Developing infrastructure for an eventual self-sustaining and 
attractive production market is commonly cited to defend subsidization schemes, 
both on the basis that they are only necessary temporarily but also provide long-
term growth (Thom and An, 2017; Davis and Kaye, 2010). On a more short-term 
analysis is an examination of the Economic Multiplier effect of bringing in 
investment and labor. Even if temporary the defense lies in utilization of local 
hotels, restaurants, supplies, and workers, who, even if short-term and below-the-
line, themselves feed into the local economy. 
 
Some proponents even go so far as to claim the cost of the subsidies can be 
below the increased tax revenue from attracted investments, but perhaps one of the 
more interesting cited benefits of subsidies, and one pushed by the MPAA, 
especially for areas unlikely to develop a substantial local industry, is the promotion 
of “film tourism”. Also called “cultural tourism”, this is an attempt to expand the 
extent of economic multiplier of subsidies. Especially for locations that are already 
attractive for tourism, and for the same reasons attractive for location shooting, 
makes an easy target to hold up as a benefit of subsidized production. Louisiana, 
one of the states aggressively offering production subsidization, is a good example 
of this. A 2015 report funded by the MPAA and local association, Louisiana Film 
and Entertainment Association (LFEA), offered the large claim that film and 
television tourism (thanks to production credits) generated up to $1.238 billion in 
personal income (HR&A, 2015). This is in comparison to the same report’s 
estimation that the credit brought $1.039 billion of production spending, and a total 
of $10 billion in tourist spending. This large claim comes from comparisons with 
Lord of the Rings tourism in New Zealand, however with an emphasis on such local 
TV productions as Duck Dynasty and Swamp People. 
 
Beyond the grandiose claim of benefits is the important aspects of the 
creation of such reports and their purpose. The MPAA partners with numerous local 
associations and small producers (such as the LFEA in Louisiana) for both a local 
and broad-based coalition to lobbying local politicians. These reports, which are 
naturally exaggerated to the benefits of not only film production but direct 
subsidization (and squarely contradict much academic conclusions), are developed 
in numerous markets, both domestic and international. While this can be seen as 
direct lobbying, or at worst regulatory capture and corruption in many cases, it also 
has a larger systemic benefit for the majors when examined holistically. First, is the 
clear race-to-the-bottom pressures to attract blockbuster production. Second, is that 
relation to local actors helping support such subsidization. Many local producers 
and labor groups, such as unions, support the Majors by working with the 
association in lobbying politicians, such as seen in the Louisiana report. The power 
relationship, beyond immediate dependence on Hollywood spending, is that these 
groups insist in reinforcing the structure of their dependence, as the MPAA 
develops such relationships in numerous competing locations. When these groups 
lobby local politicians, the coalition is legitimized by local interests, supported by 
the big money promotion by the Majors, and influenced by and reinforcing the 
norm of film subsidies as an economic solution. As Thom and An (2017) argue, 
politicians need to appear to be “doing something,” making this system of 
dependence and competition among governments, unions, and local independent 
producers a boon for the Multinational and mobile MPAA studios. 
 
When examined holistically a group of workers, unions, producers, local 
associations, and politicians support the interests of the major Multinationals due 
to their own perceived dependence. These four levels of actors--workers, local 
producers, politicians, and the Majors--all assist in reinforcing one another through 
their own developed ecosystem. Local filmmakers get access to funds with and 
without working with larger studios. Film industry workers are forced to rely on 
temporary job projects or to face the need to migrate with the mobile projects to 
locations with stronger subsidies. Politicians receive funds for government 
subsidization and can then claim that they “did something” to help local industry. 
The Majors continue to use these political and economic coalitions to deliver the 
largest subsidies.  
 
 
Local Incentives to a Neoliberal Subsidy System 
 
The International Subsidy System at its core is a result of intermixing state 
and government interests with that of major corporations. In the need to attract 
investment, lower unemployment, and raise competitiveness, subsidization has 
become a central measure to participate in the system. While a Canadian province 
may have pioneered this particular manner of economic competition, the origin of 
the system itself returns to the home state of the MPAA. The support in the United 
States for concentrating industries and strengthening corporations was heavily tied 
to the growing trade deficit as well as increased competition from growing 
economies around the world. For a time these newly empowered and 
transnationalized corporations retained American economic leadership in the 
neoliberal environment, but after thirty years we have the absurd result today of 
costly and artificial competitiveness.  
 
As a result, the systemic race-to-the-bottom and the empowerment of 
leading corporations has a spiraling effect. Existing expectations, such as open 
markets and low regulation, increases dependence on attracting these corporations, 
which itself generates leverage to expand their profit-making expectations, such as 
protecting intellectual property rights alongside subsidization. As this dependence 
on transnational corporations grows, more actors see the necessity of competing in 
the system rather than restructuring it. In other words, as neoliberal capitalism has 
both centralized corporate power and opened up labor and regulatory competition 
in international markets, impacted actors have seen a decline in the means to 
combat the negative structural effects of capitalism in helping to reproduce their 
own precarity and disposability. Unions and labor organizations are likely the 
strongest example of this as many have flipped from criticizing corporate subsidies 
to supporting them as an attempt to ensure job access. Initially unions were some 
of the first to challenge the legality of subsidies. Film workers in California, who 
were the ones to coin to the term Runaway Production, viewed subsidies in British 
Columbia as stealing production from Hollywood (Preston, 2013). Labor 
organizations even tried to use Special 301 provision to categorize subsidies as anti-
free trade: 
 
Industry workers have long been opposed to runaway production, 
considering it a form of outsourcing directly attacking their trades, crafts, 
jobs, and careers—or, more profoundly, their way of life. Coalitions of 
industry workers trying to end the negative consequences of runaway 
productions have had two viable options to consider in combating runaway 
production: (1) petitioning the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
to determine the legality of foreign film incentives; or (2) lobbying for film 
incentives at the state, local, and federal levels. On September 4, 2007, a 
group called the Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC), a coalition 
composed of unions, municipalities and individuals whose livelihood and 
economic security depend on the film and television production industry, 
filed a petition with the USTR under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.75 
In its petition, FTAC argued that subsidies offered by Canada to lure 
production and filming of U.S.-produced television shows and motion 
pictures were “inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the [World 
Trade Organization] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. McDonald (2011, pp.106) 
 The protections, laws, and rules that have become important tools for 
MNCs, including the US Special 301, ultimately failed in protecting union wages, 
benefits and jobs. The growth of dependence on attracting transnationals has 
contributed to a system that further entrenches corporate oligarchic power. As 
coalitions supporting the International Subsidy System have expanded to include 
labor, consumers and other constituents, most governments and politicians have 
taken the route of participation in the system. Through this participation there is 
little chance of reforming the clear contradictions in competing subsidies, as many 
of these states end up reinforcing the hierarchy and control of the Major Studios. 
  
Even if interest groups or associations disagree, they tend to defer to the 
more powerful group, which in most cases in film is naturally the MPAA or one or 
more of its members, giving more influence in lobbying governments. The EU has 
played a leading part in driving market logic and pushing for neoliberal policies. 
Specifically, the early EU adopted American lobbying techniques to develop 
cohesive corporate-EU representation with the WTO (Schaffer, 2006). With the 
neoliberalization of the WTO itself, this corporate relationship and lobbying was 
naturally strengthened around more complex trade relations, much like the North 
American lobbying system (Young and Peterson, 2006). As corporate-state 
relationships became closer, and subsidization became required for the industry, 
the International Subsidy System has become global, as chart Leading Subsidies 
shows: 
 
Leading International Subsidies6 
Estonia Up to 30% cash rebate for film productions. 
Hungary 25% tax incentive on eligible expenses 
Lithuania Cash rebate of up to 20% of the budget 
Macedonia 20% cash rebate on Macedonian production costs 
Czech Republic 20% rebate on qualifying Czech spending; 66% rebate on international 
costs paid to foreign above-the-line cast and crew who pay withholding 
tax in the Czech Republic 
Croatia 20% rebate on qualifying Croatian expenditure 
 
6 (Buder, 2016) 
Serbia 20% rebate on qualifying Serbian expenditure 
Poland Only Grants apparently 
Ireland 32% tax credit on local Irish expenditures  
UK 25% cash rebate and up to 80% tax relief 
Belgium The Belgian Tax Shelter allows the finance of up to 45% of Belgian-
eligible expenses. 
France 30% tax rebate on qualifying expenditures in France 
Malta 25% cash rebate of eligible expenditure with an additional 2% if the 
production features Malta culturally 
Italy 25% tax relief on qualifying expenditures 
Austria Cash rebate of 20% eligible production costs  
Germany In recent years, Germany has significantly slashed its federal film funding, 
from $95 million to the current $68 million. The DFFF offers a grant that 
covers 20% of German production costs with a maximum grant limit of 
$4.5 million (and $11 million in exceptional cases). Germany also has 17 
regional film commissions to help with production logistics and funds. 
Iceland 25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses  
Norway 25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses  
Singapore In 2004, the Singapore Tourism Board introduced the "Film in Singapore 
Scheme," which promotes production in the country by subsidizing up to 
50% of qualifying expenses incurred in Singapore, including local talent, 
production staff, and production services. Additionally, there are various 
grants available through the MDAS, including a "Production Assistance" 
grant that supports up to 40% of qualifying expenses. 
Malaysia 30% cash rebate in qualifying local expenditure 
Fiji Film Fiji offers a whopping 47% tax rebate on production spend in the 
country. 
Australia Producer Offset (40% rebate on productions shot in Australia); PDV 
Offset (30% rebate on post-production work conducted in Australia, 
regardless of where the production was shot) 
New Zealand The New Zealand Screen Production Grant offers a 20% cash rebate to 
qualifying expenditures; you can also qualify for an additional 5% uplift 
if your project meets requirements proving it will boost the country's 
economy  
Canada Depending on the province, producers can access combined federal and 
provincial tax credits ranging from 32% to 70% of eligible labor, as well 
as tax incentives on local qualifying spend ranging from 20% to 30%. 
Colombia Two-tier cash rebate system provides 40% for film services (including 
services related to post-production, artistic, and technical services), and 
another 20% for film logistical services (including services provided for 
transport, accommodation, and food) 
Trinidad & Tobago Cash rebates up to 55% for expenditures on qualifying local labor and 35% 
on other local expenditures 
Puerto Rico 40% production tax credit on all payments to Puerto Rico resident 
companies and individuals 
Dominican   
Republic 
25% transferable tax credit on all eligible expenditures including pre-
production, production, and post-production 
Panama 15% cash rebate 
Abu Dhabi 30% cash rebate on production spend; no sales tax 
South Africa 20% tax credit (production), 25% tax credit (post-production) 
 
While Subsidy programs were clearly designed with local incentives in 
mind, the contradictions that come out of a competitive subsidization process are 
apparent in the growth of the power and privilege of a Mass Media Oligarchy. The 
chart above lists only the highest offers of film production subsidies around the 
world, and therefore does not cover the entire scope of the subsidization system. 
For the Major Studios of the MPAA, the international subsidy system is both an 
effect and reinforcement of the global film oligopoly. With an international system 
of rules against classical protectionism, states have naturally moved into supporting 
the supply-side of production incentives, which is encouraged by rules codified 
within the WTO and within regional trade agreements. While one may expect 
subsidies to be the next anti-free trade topic for the WTO and trade agreements, 
that they reinforce the corporate power that participated in their development makes 
that unlikely.  
 
Rather, the Mass Media Oligopoly are focused on using international trade 
negotiations to promote a continuous expansion of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Copyright protection. Unless the system is greatly restructured, states will continue 
to choose between subsidizing leading industries, or seeing them flee, especially 
for those that are most mobile. For the Major studios, who receive the bulk of 
subsidies, are the most globally mobile, and have international access to 
partnerships and distribution, this system helps reinforce both their economic and 
political leverage, but also in building a larger coalition of labor and smaller studios 
who in turn expand their systemic influence.  
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